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Carr's Compendiums

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Carr's Compendium of the Vietnam War
A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam
A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War 1965-1972
Defense Attache Saigon: RVNAF Quarterly Assessments
Military Assistance Command Vietnam Command Histories 1964-1973 (Sanitized)
Project RED BARON I: Air-to-Air Encounters in Southeast Asia
Vietnam Pacification Studies
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A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War 1965-1972

Status: Available for Ordering
Date of Publication: 17 August 2003
Estimated Number of Pages: 2,897
Price: $100.00 (SE) and $25.00 (LE)
ISBN 0-9743733-1-1 (Standard Edition)


Development of Systems Analysis Reports

Between January 1967 and January 1972, the Southeast Asia Division of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis published monthly analyses of Vietnam war activity. These reports appeared in fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report. These reports reflected the business background of the pivotal policy-makers in the upper echelons of the U. S. government, including Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the “whiz kids” that joined his staff as analysts after being trained at the Research and Development Corporation (“RAND”).

After the end of the Vietnam war, Thomas C. Thayer re-organized the monthly reports into topical reports. Topics included Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Operations; Allied ground, naval and air operations; Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces activities; casualties and losses; population security; war costs and inflation; and construction and port operations in South Vietnam. Carr's Compendiums compiles the entire twelve-volume collection, retaining the topic-by-topic organizational plan. There are approximately 2,897 pages in this collection.

The table of contents for each volume in this collection can be viewed by clicking its link below.

Systems Analysis During the Vietnam War

The Vietnam war marks a watershed in American military thinking and planning. For the first time, the U.S. military worked alone, without advice or assistance from the State Department or any other policy-making bureaucracy. In addition, the U.S. military was the sole conduit for the statistical and analytical information that influenced the decision-makers in Washington, D.C. Lastly, McNamara revolutionized the decision-making process itself by introducing a complex, administrative system that combined program-based management control with scientific evaluations of information.

Systems analysis provided military decision-makers with information that would sharpen their judgment and provide the basis for more informed decisions. The methodology was originally developed by the RAND Corporation to evaluate alternative nuclear weapons outcomes and was later applied to social policy issues. The fundamental idea was to create a science of war, based on rigorous scientific methods that compared projected costs, benefits, and risks.


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