The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam
Volume II: Elements of Pacification


CONTENTS


LIST OF ACRONYMSix
 
PART ONE: THE NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY1
A.THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR INHERITANCE3
B.COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS7
C.EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUGGLE11
 
PART TWO: SECURITY23
INTRODUCTION25
I.EVOLUTION OF SECURITY CONCEPTS AND SUPPORT PROGRAMS29
A.THE CONCEPTUAL LEGACY29
B.SOUTH VIETNAM32
II.STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES OF THE REGULAR FORCES45
A.BACKGROUND45
B.THE DEFENSIVE VERSUS THE OFFENSIVE48
C.THE LIMITED OFFENSIVE52
III.SECURITY FORCE CONSTRAINTS -- STRENGTH, LEADERSHIP, AND TRAINING57
A.QUANTITATIVE CONSTRAINTS -- FORCE BALANCE, STRENGTH, AND EQUIPMENT58
B.QUALITATIVE CONSTRAINTS -- LEADERSHIP, MORALE, AND MOTIVATION60
C.QUALITATIVE CONSTRAINTS -- TRAINING65
IV.THE ROLE OF A GRASS ROOTS MILITIA--WHEN SHOULD THE PEOPLE BE ARMED?77
V.THE FORCE FOR LAW AND ORDER IN THE COUNTRYSIDE -- A NATIONAL POLICE FORCE OR A CONSTABULARY?81
VI.THE APPROPRIATE FORCE FOR ATTACK OF THE INSURGENT INFRASTRUCTURE -- THE MILITARY, THE TERRITORIALS, RD CADRE, OR THE NATIONAL POLICE?85
A.VCI NEUTRALIZATION EFFORTS87
B.THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM93
VII.OVER-ALL APPRAISAL OF THE SECURITY SITUATION95
VIII.LESSONS LEARNED99
A.GENERAL99
B.CONCEPTUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL101
C.STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL102
D.PRIORITIES FOR, AND TYPES OF SECURITY FORCES104
E.THE TRAINING AND ADVISORY EFFORT108
 
PART THREE: DEVELOPMENT111
I.MAJOR DEVELOPMENT ISSUES113
II.VILLAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATION119
A.THE EARLY CONTEST FOR CONTROL AT THE LOCAL LEVEL120
B."NEW LIFE HAMLETS" YIELD TO REEMPHASIS ON THE VILLAGES123
C.PESIDENT THIEU'S STRESS ON LOCAL ADMINISTRATION125
D.CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENT127
III.THE EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT131
A.EARLY CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS131
B."COUNTERINSURGENCY" AND THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM140
C.INTERREGNUM: DEBATE OVER STRATEGY146
D.REEMPHASIS ON PACIFICATION151
IV.DEVELOPMENT OF CADRE TECHNIQUES161
A.CIVIC ACTION PERIOD161
B.STRATEGIC HAMLET PERIOD162
C.POST-DIEM PERIOD166
D.RECENT STATUS OF CADRE PROGRAMS170
V.THREE FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF DEVELOPMENT INTEREST173
A.ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT173
B.THE MILITARY FORCES IN CIVIC ACTION177
C.THE REFUGEE PROBLEM180
VI.LESSONS LEARNED183
 
PART FOUR: REPORTING AND EVALUATION191
INTRODUCTION193
I.DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF DIEM195
A.SEPARATE AGENCY REPORTING195
B.EARLY PACIFICATION REPORTING199
C.OTHER REPORTING SOURCES201
II.REASSESSMENT AND TRANSITION207
A.REASSESSMENT EFFORTS207
B.NEW FIELD REPORTING SYSTEM210
III.THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES)215
A.AFTERMATH OF HONOLULU CONFERENCE215
B.INTRODUCTION OF THE HES219
C.HES-70224
D.SUBORDINATE AND ASSOCIATED HES REPORTS226
IV.LESSONS LEARNED IN REPORTING AND EVALUATION229
 
PART FIVE: SELECTED RELATED ISSUES237
I.THE URBAN PROBLEM239
A.INTRODUCTION239
B.VIETNAM'S CITIES IN THE INSURGENCY239
C.VIETNAM'S CITIES IN THE FUTURE244
D.THIRD WORLD CITIES IN FUTURE INSURGENCIES247
E.CONCLUSIONS250
II.LAND REFORM251
A.INTRODUCTION251
B.EARLY GVN LAND REFORM EFFORTS251
C.INTERIM EFFORTS256
D.LAND-TO-THE-TILLER258
E.LESSONS LEARNED263
III.ORGANIZATION265
A.INITIAL AMERICAN EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE THE OTHER WAR266
B.REAPPRAISAL285
C.THE VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATION TO DEAL WITH PACIFICATION295
D.SOME LESSONS300
IV.ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM, 1963-1969305
A.INTRODUCTION305
B.STATUS AND CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY307
C.CONTRIBUTION OF US AID AND PURCHASES TO THE ECONOMY314
D.SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AGGRAVATED BY THE ADMINISTRATION OF US PURCHASES AND AID320
E.RELEVANCE TO CURRENT US FOREIGN POLICY326
 
MAP OF SOUTH VIETNAM ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS330
ANNEX: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND CONSULTED331