A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam
Volume I
The Enemy

TABLE OF CONTENTS


FOREWORD
iii
PREFACE
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES
xix
LIST OF TABLES
xxi
LIST OF MAPS
xxiii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EX-1 to EX-11

1. THE ENEMY'S GOALS
Page
A. Introduction
1-1
B. The Relationship of Communist Vietnamese Goals
1-2
1. Communist Strategies 1954-1959
1-3
2. Communist Strategies 1959-1963
1-8
3. Formation of the National Liberation Front/People's Revolutionary Party (NLF/PRP)
1-10
4. DRV Strategies 1964-1968
1-13
5. The Central Offensive and General Uprising Strategy, 1968
1-16
6. DRV Strategies 1969-1972
1-19
7. The 1972 Main Force Attack Strategy
1-21
8. Communist Strategies 1973-1975
1-22
C. Summary
1-23
D. Analytical Summary and Insights
1-25
E. Lessons
1-26

2. CHARACTER AND WILL
A. Introduction
2-1
B. Identification of the DRV Leaders
2-2
1. Characteristics of North Vietnamese Leadership
2-2
2. Key DRV Leaders
2-5
3. Leadership of the NLF
2-9
C. Debates Within the Leadership
2-10
D. Elements Supporting the Tenacity of Communist Vietnamese Leaders
2-12
1. The Correct Solution
2-12
2. Understanding the Contradictions
2-13
3. Morale and Will of the Soldiers
2-14
4. Morale and Will of the North Vietnamese
2-18
E. Analytical Summary: Insights
2-19
F. Lessons
2-21

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF)
A. Introduction and General Overview
3-2
B. Principles of Revolutionary Organization
3-3
1. Principles Governing the Party Control Apparatus
3-4
2. Mass Organization Strategy
3-7
3. The Military Organization
3-10
C. Historical Perspective
3-12
1. Party Development and the Front Organizations
3-12
2. Party Development and the Provisional Government
3-15
D. The Organization of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
3-16
1. Organization for the Dang Lao Dong Party
3-17
2. The Government Organization of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
3-17
3. Organization of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
3-20
4. Summary Analysis: A Triad System of Government
3-22
E. The Organization of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSVN)
3-22
1. The Party Organization in South Vietnam; the Core of the Struggle Movement
3-24
2. The Organization of the National Liberation Front
3-26
3. The Military Command Structure: The People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Guerrilla Popular Army
3-28
4. Summary Analysis: Organizational Relationships
3-29
F. Provisional Revolutionary Government
3-34
1. The Background
3-34
2. The PRG Emerges
3-34
G. Summary and Insights
3-35
H. Lessons
3-38

4. MOBILIZATION
A. Introduction
4-1
B. Communist Vietnamese Mobilization: Background
4-2
C. Mobilization in the North
4-6
1. Military Personnel Requirements
4-6
2. Civilian Manpower Requirements in the North
4-7
3. Impact of Mobilization on the North Vietnamese Economy
4-10
4. Motivation Efforts in the North
4-15
D. Mobilization in the South
4-17
E. Analytical Summary--Insights
4-28
F. Lesson
4-29

5. BASES, SANCTUARIES, AND LOC
A. Introduction
5-1
B. Evolution of the Viet Minh Logistical Structures
5-2
1. The World War II Years
5-2
2. The First Indochina War
5-2
3. Dien Bien Phu
5-8
4. Significance of Early Viet Minh Logistics
5-9
C. Consolidation 1954-1959
5-9
1. The Chinese Connection
5-9
2. The Soviet Connection
5-10
3. Viet Minh Strongholds in RVN
5-10
4. Logistical Preparations for Insurgency
5-10
5. Significance of the Consolidation Period
5-12
D. Logistics in the Revolutionary Struggle 1959-1964
5-12
1. The Fateful DRV Decision
5-12
2. Infiltration Routes
5-14
3. Logistics 0rganizations
5-16
4. Logistical Significance 1959-1964
5-23
E. PAVN/PLAF Logistics 1965-1975
5-25
1. The Buildup
5-25
2. Foreign Support
5-25
3. Expanding Lines of Communication and Base Areas
5-26
4. Synopsis of PAVN/PLAF Combat Operations
5-37
5. Significance of PAVN/PLAF Logistics 1965-1975
5-42
F. Strategic LOC 1965-1975
5-43
1. The Three Strategic LOC's
5-43
2. Vulnerabilities of the Strategic LOC
5-44
3. Assessing the Strategic LOC
5-46
G. Analytical Summary and Insights
5-46
H. Lessons
5-49

6. EXTERNAL SUPPORT
A. Introduction and Overview
6-1
B. Ideological/Political Support Provided by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
6-5
1. Background
6-5
2. Points of Agreement and Disagreement Between Peking and Hanoi
6-5
3. Support Provided to the NLF by the People's Republic of China
6-16
C. Ideological-Political Support Provided by the Soviet Union
6-17
1. Background
6-17
2. Sino and US Influences on Moscow's Aid to the DRV
6-19
3. Ideological-Political Support Provided by the USSR to the NLF
6-24
D. Actual Support (Military, Economic and Technical) Provided to the DRV-NLF by the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China and Others Sympathetic to the DRV-NLF Cause
6-25
1. Introduction
6-25
2. Economic and Technical Aid to the DRV/NLF
6-26
3. Military Assistance Provided to the DRV/NLF
6-27
E. Analytical Summary and Insights
6-27
F. Lessons
6-31
Appendix A
6-35
Appendix B
6-37
Appendix C
6-38
Appendix D
6-39

7. CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY
A. Introduction
7-1
B. Major Goals and Policies of the Leaderships of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front
7-1
C. Long-Standing International and Domestic Constraints on Policy
7-2
1. International Constraints
7-2
2. Domestic Constraints
7-4
3. Military Constraints
7-8
D. Major Changes in Constraints - Conflict Environment
7-10
1. 1954-1956
7-10
2. 1965
7-11
3. 1968
7-12
4. 1972
7-14
5. 1973-1975 (final reversal)
7-16
E. Summary
7-17
F. Summary Analysis and Insights
7-20
G. Lessons
7-21
BIBLIOGRAPHY
B-1 to B-21
GLOSSARY
G-1 to G-3

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